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Symposium on Spyware: The Latest Cyber-Regulatory Challenge
Contracting Spyware by Contract1
20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1345 (2005)
Jane K. Winn
Abstract
The question of what constitutes “spyware” is controversial because many programs
that are “adware” in the eyes of their distributors may be perceived as “spyware” in the
eyes of the end user. Many of these programs are loaded on the computers of end users
after the end user has agreed to the terms of a license presented in a click-through
interface. This paper analyzes whether it might be possible to reduce the volume of
unwanted software loaded on end users’ computers by applying contract law doctrine
more strictly. Unwanted programs are often bundled with programs that the end user
wants, but the disclosure that additional programs will be downloaded is usually buried
deeply within dense form contracts. Even though this makes it difficult for end users to
recognize that they are agreeing to have multiple programs installed at once and that
some of those programs may be objectionable, US courts are unlikely to invalidate
those disclosures. This is because in business to consumer online contracting cases in
the US, courts have tended to be very deferential to the intentions of the merchants in
designing the contract interfaces. In the EU, by contrast, such conduct by software
distributors would not be binding on consumers. Under unfair contract terms laws in
place in EU member states, consumer objections to bundled software could not be
overridden by terms hidden in standard form contracts.
1. Introduction: From Goodware to Badware2 to Somewhere In Between
Does contract law provide consumers whose computers are clogged with spyware any
tools to defend themselves against this onslaught of unwanted software? The answer is likely to
be no, as courts have shown themselves generally willing to enforce online contracts
notwithstanding questions about what consumers actually knew or intended when the contract
was formed. Although at one extreme it is easy to identify “badware” – viruses, Trojan horses
and other clearly malicious programs – and at the other, it is equally easy to identify “goodware”
– popular shareware or freeware applications – there is considerable uncertainty about what end
users really think about many programs. Furthermore, software that some commentators label
pernicious “spyware” is considered to be comparatively benign “adware” by others, making it
hard to be certain what an individual consumer would think of the program in question and
whether the consumer would agree to contract for it.3

1. Professor & Director, Shidler Center for Law, Commerce & Technology, University of Washington School of
Law at http://www.law.washington.edu/Faculty/Winn/. Many thanks to my research assistant Andrew Braff for all
his help.
2. Thanks to my colleague Bill Covington for suggesting these terms to characterize the two ends of the spectrum of
applications that have been labeled spyware.
3. Weatherbug is perceived by some to be a legitimate piece of software and adware/spyware by others. Compare
PC Hell: How to Remove Weatherbug at http://www.pchell.com/support/weatherbug.shtml (Aug. 17, 2005) with

In evaluating online contracts, courts generally have shown more deference to the intent
of the merchants who design the contract interfaces than to the expectations of consumers using
them. In the event any consumers claim software was loaded on their computers without
authorization, that deference toward the intent of the online interface designer is likely to protect
distributors of programs that deliver “targeted marketing”4 to consumers using a click-through
contract interface.
In order for contract law to provide a meaningful constraint on the distribution of
spyware programs, a major revision of current contract law would be required. Legislation
pending in Congress in 2005 proposes to do just that: require explicit notice and consent from
end users before spyware can be loaded onto their computers.5 Assuming such a strategy might
actually have an impact on the volume of spyware distributed,6 it remains unclear whether such a
piecemeal, ad hoc approach is a sensible approach to contract law reform. A similar strategy of
narrowly targeted sector-specific reforms has been used in U.S. information privacy law for the
last two decades with disastrous results;7 it is not clear that such a strategy would be any more
successful when applied to contract law. By contrast, the more general regulatory approach
taken in the EU Unfair Contract Terms Directive8 could be used both to block the use of
misleading contract interfaces to legitimate the distribution of spyware and to provide critical
scrutiny of merchant designed contracting interfaces generally.
The label “spyware” has been applied to a wide range of software applications, and it is
difficult to identify an authoritative definition of spyware which would clarify the scope of the
problem.9 Because an in-depth analysis of competing definitions of spyware is beyond the scope
of this paper, this paper will take the following definition from the Federal Trade Commission
2004 Federal Register Notice:
[Spyware is] software…that aids in gathering information about a person or
organization without their knowledge and that may send such information to
another entity without the consumer's consent, or that asserts control over a
computer without the consumer's knowledge.10
Weatherbug Frequently Asked Questions: Is Weatherbug spyware or adware? at
http://www.weatherbug.com/aws/support/faq_spyware.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2005).
4. “Targeted marketing” consists of making “the right offer to the right customer at the right time.” See Affiliate
Program Glossary, available at http://affiliatetip.com/affiliate_glossary.php (last visited May 1, 2005).
5. “Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act’ or the ‘Spy Act,’ H.R. 29, 109th Cong. (2005).
6. This would be in contrast to the CAN SPAM Act, which one year after enactment “clearly has had no
meaningful impact on the unrelenting flow of spam that continues to clog the Internet and plague inboxes.” Keith
Regan, “CAN-SPAM Gets Mixed Report Card for First Year,” MacNewsWorld.com, Jan. 3, 2005, at
http://www.macnewsworld.com/story/39354.html.
7. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 58 (2003); Will
Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 285 (2003)
8. Council Directive 93/13 EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29.
9. See, e.g., SpywareGuide, which described over 1,500 programs that met its definition of spyware in May 2005,
states “There are a lot of differing opinions on what the definitions of Parasiteware Spyware, Adware and Malware
should be.” See Intro to Spyware at http://www.spywareguide.com/txt_intro.php (last visited May 1, 2005) (listing
parasiteware, adware. spyware, malware, page hijackers and dialers as various types of software that may be
covered by the term spyware.); see also, Consumers Union, Press Release: Consumer Reports Investigates How to
Protect Against Spam, Spyware and Phishing, August 9, 2004 (“Spyware isn’t a single type of software. The term
covers a diverse range of applications.”) available at
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_product_safety/001305.html (last visited May 1, 2005).
10. Notice Announcing Public Workshop and Requesting Public Comment, 69 Fed. Reg. 8538 (February 24, 2004).
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Not all distributors of programs covered by this definition of spyware use contracting interfaces
to help manage their relationship with those consumers whose computers run their software.
Distributors of software that includes viruses or other malware that permit the software
developer to commit identity theft or to access the end user’s financial accounts without
authorization can distribute their programs with interfaces that do not require the cooperation of
the end user and so have no reason to ask the end user to assent to the download. The following
discussion will address only those software distributors that include contracting interfaces in
their distribution systems.
There are many popular “shareware” or “freeware” programs11 that provide unambiguous
benefits to end users who manifest assent to their end user license agreements by using a clickthrough interface.12 Because end users’ understanding of a program’s function and the users’
level of interest in granting programs access to their computers is uncertain, many targeted
marketing or adware programs fall somewhere in between the extremes of universally detested
and virulent spyware and acclaimed and popular freeware. While many end users might
welcome targeted comparison shopping information about products they are actively seeking,
they also may hate popup ads. End users might not understand either the specific quid pro quo
that a particular targeting marketing company is offering (e.g., free access now to desirable
content in return for exposure to popup ads in the future), or the mechanism by which that quid
pro quo is enforced (e.g., adware applications loaded on the end user’s computer).
This paper focuses only on those ambiguous cases where a merchant has a plausible
claim that consumers have consented to the collection of personal information in exchange for
some product or service, but consumers have a plausible claim that there was no consent. The
application of contract law to spyware programs in this ambiguous, intermediate position
between goodware and badware produces uncertain outcomes, in part because the intent of the
end user in contracting or downloading is uncertain. The recent trend in contact cases toward
liberalizing contract formation doctrine, in effect removing obstacles to the greater use of new
technologies, makes it unlikely that contract law might be used to establish a framework within
which more explicit consent must be sought before the collection of personal information could
begin. While courts may be unwilling to invalidate clickwrap agreements that legitimate the
distribution of adware programs that many find annoying, such deference has limits. Thus, there
is no reason to expect that judicial deference to online contracts will extend so far as to
legitimate the distribution of clearly malicious programs that support fraudulent or criminal
activities.
2. Interpreting Ambiguous Online Contracting Interfaces
Targeted marketing firms that collect personal information in exchange for providing
products or services to consumers use contracting interfaces similar to those used by other online
merchants: click-through interfaces that seek blanket assent to standard form contracts. What
11. “Shareware is software that is distributed free on a trial basis with the understanding that the user may need or
want to pay for it later.” Whatis.com definition. “Freeware... is programming that is offered at no cost and is a
common class of small applications available for downloading and use in most operating systems.” Whatis.com
definition.
12. See, e.g., the contracting interfaces for the most popular free software downloads listed at
http://www.download.com/ (last visited May 1, 2005).
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often distinguishes the online contracting processes used marketing firms such as Claria and
WhenU is that consumers may not realize that when they click “I agree” in response to what
appears to be a standard end user license agreement (EULA),13 they are licensing a bundle of
different applications, and included in that bundle are programs that have been labeled spyware
by consumer advocates.14 Consumers may intend to download a single application and end up
instead downloading several programs, including some they do not want, either by inadvertence,
because the desired application is not available without the extra programs, or because the
different programs have actually been combined into one. The problem of inadvertent or
qualified assent is exacerbated by the fact that many adware programs are difficult to locate and
remove because they are not listed in the “Add/Remove Programs” function provided by
Microsoft Windows operating systems.15
Before asking whether assent to the terms of adware EULAs should be treated differently
than assent to other Internet contracts, it may be useful to consider the current state of Internet
contracting doctrine generally. Whether assent to an offer to form a contract has been
manifested is a fact-specific inquiry. The Restatement provides that manifestation of assent may
be by written or spoken words or by other acts or by failure to act but the conduct in question
must be intentional or the actor must have reason to know conduct will be treated as assent by
other party. In the absence of such a manifestation of assent, then the contract may be voidable
for fraud, duress, mistake or any other invalidating cause.16 The manifestation of mutual assent
to any exchange ordinarily takes the form of an offer or proposal by one party followed by an
acceptance by the other party or parties;17 however, a manifestation of mutual assent may be
made even though neither offer nor acceptance can be identified and even though the moment of
formation cannot be determined.18 The application of these principles that guide the inquiry into
13. Use of adware distributed by Claria (formerly known as Gator) is governed by an end user license agreement
accessible at the website for Gain Publishing; see, e.g., Gain Publishing Privacy Statement and End User License
Agreement 7.0 issued December 2004, available at
http://www.gainpublishing.com/global/help/app_privacy/app_ps_v70.html (last visited May 1, 2005). WhenU
distributes a wide variety of direct marketing programs that are considered spyware by others, including SaveNow,
WhenUShop, WeatherCast, ClockSynch and PriceBandit. Copies of the end user license agreement for each
product can be accessed at http://www.whenu.com/support.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2005); the contract interface
used is described at http://www.whenu.com/how_whenu_works_dl.html (last visited May 1, 2005).
14. See, e.g., Tatiana Serafin, Mr. Manners, FORBES, July 26, 2004, at 133 (“The Federal Trade Commission held
workshops on spyware in April, knocking companies (read Claria and WhenU) for failing to disclose how their
software programs glom on to PCs and how they misbehave thereafter.”).
15. Id.
16. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19.
17. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 states that an offer is defined as the manifestation of willingness to
enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to the bargain is invited
and will conclude it.
18. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 22; accord U.C.C. § 2-204:
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement,
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the moment
of its making is undetermined.
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness
if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an
appropriate remedy.
U.C.C. § 2-204.
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whether a contract has been formed to standard form contracts raises troubling, unresolved issues
about the meaningfulness of the assent.19 The Restatement’s provisions addressing the use of
standard form contracting attempt to balance the pervasive use of forms with the desire to
preserve some vestige of concern about the character of the assent to the contents of forms.20
The apparent conflict between the freedom of choice ideology embedded in contract
doctrine and the magnitude of the constraints imposed on consumer choice by standard form
contracts does not appear to be any more acute in the online environment than it has been in
traditional markets.21 There does not appear to be any clear evidence that consumers are less
able to deal with click-through contracting interfaces than they were able to deal with traditional
paper standard form contracts, or that legitimate merchants use click-through interfaces to take
advantage of consumers any more often than they did with printed form contracts. Furthermore,
the question remains whether the presence of a discernable assent should really be the criteria for
distinguishing between enforceable and unenforceable contracts formed using new contracting
systems.22
While it may be difficult to ascertain whether courts are more or less deferential to
merchants seeking enforcement of contracts formed with new contracting systems than they were
toward merchants in traditional markets, it is not difficult to ascertain the overall trend of
deference to merchant interface design choices in the face of consumer objections.23 Because
spyware is delivered exclusively in online environments, the debate surrounding the
enforceability of “shrinkwrap”24 “pay now, terms later”25 contracts is not relevant here.26 The

19. Contract scholars have recognized for nearly a century that the use of standard form contract is widespread but
at the same time fails to conform to classical 19th century freedom of contract principles and debated strategies for
dealing with this contradiction. See Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L. J. 34 (1917);
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629
(1943); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-Making Power, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 529 (1971).
20. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or otherwise manifests
assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly used to embody terms
of agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to
the terms in the writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly situated,
without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do
so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, that term is not part of the agreement.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211.
21. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 429, 432-34 (2002).
22. Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 681 (2004) (arguing that
it is possible to determine whether a contract should be enforced without reference to intent).
23. See, e.g., James J. White, Autistic Contracts, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1693 (2000) (noting the trend with approval);
Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L.
REV. 1805, 1807 (2000) (noting the trend with disapproval).
24. See generally Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-friendly Mass Market Licensing For
Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687 (2004).
25. See generally Gillette, supra note 22 (using the term “rolling contracts” to describe “pay now, terms later”
contracts).
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best indication of how courts would likely respond to consumer complaints about the
enforceability of adware EULAs will come from cases addressing the enforceability of
“clickwrap” and “browsewrap” agreements. Clickwrap contract interfaces require some explicit
manifestation of assent by the consumer to form a contract; in most cases, the consumer is asked
to select between graphical representations of “I accept” and “I decline” by clicking on the
chosen alternative.27 Browsewrap terms and conditions are usually found behind a hyperlink
marked something like “Legal” or “Terms” or “Use of this site signifies your acceptance of the
Terms and Conditions.” Because end users must seek out browsewrap terms in order to learn
their contents, there is considerable disagreement over whether browsewrap interfaces can be
used to form contracts at all.28 However, the mere fact that some courts have been willing to
entertain the idea that an online contract could be formed without any apparent manifestation of
assent by the end user is an important development in this area.29
The first cases holding explicitly that a click-through interface design could be used to
form a binding contract appeared in 1998.30 In all, more than a dozen cases have been decided
upholding the enforceability of contracts formed using click-through interfaces.31 In only a few
cases have courts refused to enforce specific terms contained within contracts formed using a
click-through interface, and the terms at issue have been found to violate a public policy of the
forum state or to be unconscionable. In one, a court refused to enforce a choice of forum term
that would have required a Massachusetts resident to file suit in Virginia, which does not
generally permit class action law suits, because it found that to do so would in effect deprive
Massachusetts consumers of any right to challenge the merchant’s performance under the
contract.32 In Comb v. PayPal, Inc., a federal district court refused to enforce an arbitration
agreement contained in a clickwrap agreement after the merchant presented inadequate evidence
26. See Gillette, supra note 22 at 685-88 (summarizing the debate); see also Christina L. Kunz, Maureen F. Del
Duca, Heather Thayer & Jennifer C. Dubrow, Click-Through Agreements: Strategies for Avoiding Disputes on
Validity of Assent, 57 BUS. LAW. 401 (2001) (ABA Working Group on Electronic Contracting Practices report).
27. Id.
28. See Christina L. Kunz, John E. Ottaviani, Elaine D. Ziff, Juliet M. Moringiello, Kathleen M. Porter, & Jennifer
C. Debrow, Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW.
279 (2003) (ABA Working Group on Electronic Contracting Practices report).
29. See generally id.
30. The first appears to have been Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie, Inc., 1998 WL 388389, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020
(BNA) (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (preliminary injunction to stop spammer from using Hotmail’s e-mail service
because no e-mail account could be set up without clicking through online registration agreement prohibiting the
sending of unsolicited commercial e-mail); a close second seems to have been Groff v. America Online, 1998 WL
307001 (R.I. Super. 1998) (no authorization to proceed with class action lawsuit when all members of putative class
would have had to click through online registration agreement with choice of forum clause pointing to a different
jurisdiction).
31. Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); In re RealNetworks, Inc.
Privacy Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584 (N.D. Ill., 2000); Lieschke v. RealNetworks, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1683 (N.D. Ill., 2000); America Online v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Barnett v.
Network Solutions, 38 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. App. 2001); Forrest v. Verizon Communs., Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C.
2002); Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, (App. Div. 2002); Net2phone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 149 (Ct. App. 2003); DeJohn v. .TV Corp. Int'l, 245 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Davidson & Assocs.
v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170 (E.D. Mo., 2004); Mortgage Plus, Inc. v. DocMagic, Inc., 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20145 (D. Kan., 2004).
32 Williams v. America Online, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 11 (February 8, 2001); accord Scarcella v. America
Online, 798 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Civ. Ct. 2004) (refuses to enforce AOL forum selection clause when alterative is small
claims court); but see Celmins v. America Online, 748 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999); America Online v. Booker,
781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001) (enforcing the same term against Florida residents).
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of what contract terms had actually been displayed to the plaintiffs when they enrolled in the
service or that those terms had subsequently been validly modified to include an arbitration term
and the plaintiffs alleged deplorable misconduct on the part of the merchant.33
Given the strong trend in recent cases favoring the enforcement of clickwrap agreements
in the absence of a conflict between a requirement of a term in the contract and a fundamental
public policy of the forum, or evidence of misconduct so egregious that it might rise to the level
of unconscionable, courts are likely to find that adware EULAs are enforceable contracts. Most
recent clickwrap cases deal with consumer objections to the level of service provided by online
service providers, and a consumer might try to distinguish a service contract under which a
consumer gains access to e-mail and the Internet generally from an agreement under which a
consumer gains access to comparison advertising presented in the form of annoying pop-up ads.
However, in the absence of any evidence of serious misuse of personally identifiable information
by the adware company, the distinction is unlikely to be persuasive.
One distinction between most clickwrap agreements with online service providers and
adware companies is that, while consumers may rarely read and understand the terms of the
online service provider’s form contract before manifesting assent to it, and thus may find quite a
few of the terms contained in the form surprising, they are likely to have a reasonably accurate
idea of what the other party to the contract will provide. In the adware context, consumers may
not have an accurate idea of what the other party will provide if the adware programs are
bundled with other programs and the bundling is disclosed only in the form contract. Many
consumers know they are downloading at least one program they want, but generally do not
understand that their access to that program is conditioned on accepting a second program that
will monitor their online conduct and transmit information about them to a third party so that
relevant comparison ads can be shown to them in the future.34 In other words, consumers are
paying for access to the programs or services they want by using their personal information and
displays of comparison ads as currency.
Anecdotally, many consumers apparently believe that licenses to online content or access
to online services are being granted in return for nothing more than a release of liability from the
consumer to the provider. Given the popularity of such business models during the dot-com
bubble, it might be difficult to say that such consumer expectations are unreasonable. However,
few cases considering the enforceability of clickwrap agreements consider whether consumer
claims to be surprised by arbitration agreements or choice of forum clauses that make it
prohibitively expensive for consumers to sue online merchants are reasonable. It seems likely,
therefore, that the need to avoid frustrating reasonable consumer expectations about the online
environment will lay adequate grounds to refuse enforcement of adware EULAs.
Although several courts have held that browsewrap interfaces do not establish
manifestation of assent to contract terms,35 not all that have considered the issue have so held.36
33. 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
34. Ben Elgin, Guess What -- You Asked For Those Pop-Up Ads, BUSINESS WEEK, June 28, 2004, at 94.
35. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987, 18 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Specht v. Netscape, 306
F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 2002); In re Northwest Airlines Privacy Litigation 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10580 (D. Minn. 2004).
36. Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (refusing summary judgment dismissing
contract claims); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F.Supp 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that contract was
formed by posted terms even without click-though interface where evidence showed that defendant had actual
knowledge of terms); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH)
P28,607 (2003) (reviewing a revised Ticketmaster interface and refusing Tickets.com summary judgment dismissing
contract claims).
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While this split in the cases hardly justifies advising a client that embedding the terms of a
contract behind an obscure hyperlink may result in an enforceable contract, courts’ unwillingness
to uniformly reject such a suggestion as preposterous demonstrates the depth of the deference
that courts show to those who develop innovative contracting interfaces with what appears to be
cavalier disregard for established contract law doctrine. Closer examination of the cases reveals
that all three cases holding either that browsewrap might be the basis of a contract – or at least
that summary judgment against the party advancing that argument would be premature – involve
business-to-business contracts, not business-to-consumer contracts. Furthermore, in all three
cases the party claiming that a browsewrap interface can be used to form a contract also had
strong claims that the defendant should also be held liable for unfair competition. If the cases
holding that browsewrap might be enough to form a contract are in substance disguised unfair
competition cases, then consumers finding fault with the ambiguity of adware EULA contract
interfaces should be able to distinguish those cases. But because adware distributors appear to be
happy to use click-through interfaces, this distinction is unlikely to help many consumers who
object to the adware on their computers.
3. Liability under Other Forms of Online Market Regulation
Because it seems unlikely that contract law will provide much protection to consumers
from unwanted adware, the possibility that other doctrines that regulate market conduct could
provide a shield should be explored. However, a review of unfair competition, deceptive trade
practices, electronic surveillance, and computer fraud laws provides little more hope for
disgruntled consumers than contract law does.
Both federal and state unfair competition laws provide competitors a cause of action to
object to improper conduct by merchants on behalf of consumers rather than providing
consumers with a direct cause of action. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act created a federal law
of unfair competition; in 1988 its scope was expanded by the Trademark Law Revision Act,
which codified more than two decades of case law. Section 43(a) prohibits the use in
commercial advertising of any word, term, name, symbol or device or false or misleading
statement of fact that misrepresents the nature, characteristics or quality of goods, services or
commercial activities.37 Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition Law
provides that “one who, in connection with marketing of goods or services, makes a
representation relating to the actor’s own goods, services, or commercial activities that is likely
to deceive or mislead prospective purchasers to the likely commercial detriment of another” may
be liable to the other. As with § 43(a), the appropriate remedy in the absence of a showing of
specific harm to a competitor is injunctive relief.38 Companies whose customers are shown
comparison ads by means of adware may well have an unfair competition claim against the
adware company or its customer whose comparison ad is displayed, but consumers would not be
able to bring suit in their own names if no competitor was willing to act.
Because spyware involves the transmission of personal information without the
knowledge or consent of the person whose information is being sent, and because federal
deceptive trade practices law has been the foundation of Federal Trade Commission efforts to

37. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
38. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition Law § 35.
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increase the level of protection given to personal information,39 federal deceptive trade practices
law actions seem like a promising strategy to help consumers fight back against unwanted
adware programs. By 2005, however, the FTC had announced only one spyware enforcement
action.40 Because many states have enacted “Little FTC Acts” with provisions similar to Section
5 of the FTC Act that are enforced by state attorneys general or that grant a private cause of
action to consumers, consumers may have better luck fighting spyware with state deceptive trade
practices law than with federal.
In 1968, Congress enacted the Wiretap Act to establish a framework within which police
would be permitted monitor telephone communications. In 1986, Congress revised the statute to
include electronic communications,41 which is now known as the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA).42 The second title of the ECPA also added an entirely new regulatory
program, the Stored Communications Act, which covers access to certain stored
communications.43 The ECPA applies not only to government monitoring of electronic
communications, but also to monitoring by private parties. The ECPA generally prohibits
anyone other than the sender and intended recipient of a message from intercepting it in transit,
accessing it after it has been stored, or disclosing its contents. The ECPA restricts the ability of
both government agents and private parties to monitor electronic communications.
An important exception to the application of the ECPA exists where one of the parties to
the communication has consented to the monitoring.44 The scope of this exception for monitoring
consented to by one of the parties to an electronic communication has recently been the subject
of considerable controversy in the context of Internet commerce. If a website operator monitors
the activities of visitors to its site and also posts a privacy policy explaining the scope of the
personal information it collects and the uses to which it puts that information, then even though
the visitor may not have expressly consented to the collection of the information, the visitor has
been provided with notice. Many website operators permit third parties to post banner ads on
their sites, and many of the providers of banner ads also monitor the conduct of visitors to the
website hosting the ad and collect personal information about those visitors, which is later
analyzed to permit more accurate targeting of advertisements. If the providers of banner ads
place “cookies” on the hard drives of visitors to websites hosting the ads, the visitors may be
unaware of the fact that someone other than the operator of the website is monitoring their online
activity and furthermore may not know how to discover the identity of the banner ad provider or
learn its privacy policies.
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)45 addresses unauthorized access and misuse
of computers and computer networks. The CFAA prohibits various forms of unauthorized
39. Section 5 of the FTC Act provides “Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are hereby declared unlawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).
Since the late 1990s, the FTC has been encouraging online businesses to disclose their privacy practices and taking
enforcement actions based on its deceptive trade practices authority against online businesses that fail to do what
their privacy policies say. See FTC descriptions of all the enforcement actions it has taken against online businesses
for failing to follow their posted privacy policies, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/promises_enf.html (last viewed Aug. 18, 2005).
40. FTC v. Seismic Entm't Prods., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22788 (D.N.H., 2004); FTC Press Release, October 12,
2004, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/10/spyware.htm (last viewed May 1, 2005).
41. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
42. Codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2005).
43. Codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2005).
44. 18 USC § 2511(3)(b)
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
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access of “protected computers.” In 1996, the definition of “protected computer” was
considerably expanded: now any unauthorized interference with a computer with access to the
Internet may be a federal crime.46 The CFAA prohibits unauthorized access or exceeding
authorized access to obtain information from a protected computer,47 accessing a protected
computer with intent to defraud or obtain anything of value,48 or intentionally harming a
protected computer.49
An in depth exploration of the application of these statutes to spyware generally is
provided in “Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance” by Patricia Bellia.50 Some recent attempts
to use these statutes as the basis for class action lawsuits based on allegations of online privacy
violations indicate that their application to unwanted adware in particular may not prove to be
very helpful.51
If the consumer could claim that unwanted adware running on a computer substantially
interfered with the consumer’s use of that computer, then it might be possible to make out a
trespass to chattels claim.52 Once again, while there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the
scope of such a claim in light of conflicting case law, the trend in recent cases has been for courts
to be more skeptical of such claims and to ask computer owners to tolerate more unwanted
interference with the use of computers connected to the Internet.53
4. Regulatory Alternatives to Contract Doctrine
Because none of the obvious alternatives to liability for breach of contract seem any more
likely to give consumers an effective legal remedy against the unwanted distribution of adware,
many law reform proposals have been offered. Given that “unfair competition” is the body of
law that addresses overzealous competition among merchants, perhaps what is needed is a new
doctrine of “unfair marketing” that protects online consumers against overzealous marketing by
online merchants. A claim of unfair marketing of adware might be defended by a showing that
the adware company had clearly and explicitly disclosed to the consumer what the consumer
would be giving up in exchange for whatever product or service the consumer intended to accept.
In fact, that was more or less the approach taken in Congress in 2005 when H.R. 29, the Securely
Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, or “Spy Act,” was introduced.54
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5).
50
20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1283 (2005).
51. In re Doubleclick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 519-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138
F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1279-81 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
52. Trespass to chattels is defined as the unauthorized, intentional, and substantial use of or intermeddling with
another’s tangible personal property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217–218 (1965).
53. Trespass was found in Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559 (1996);
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc.,
100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F.Supp 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); EF
Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2003). No trespass was found in Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.com, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P28,607 (2003); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th
1342 (2003); Southwest Airlines Co. v. FareChase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435 (N.D. Tex. 2004); Nautical Solutions
Mktg. v. Boats.com, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6304 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
54. The 109th Congress Spy Act is similar to the 108th Spy Act that passed overwhelmingly in the House but
stalled in the Senate.
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The Spy Act’s “notice and consent” approach55 to dealing with unwanted adware appears
to be drawn more from tort law than from contract law, which is consistent with an unfair
competition approach. As a narrowly targeted response to the problem of unwanted adware, the
Spy Act may well have a material impact on the business models and software designs of
legitimate adware distributors.56 If the Spy Act is characterized as a narrowly targeted reform of
contract law, however, its likely impact will be much less positive. U.S. information privacy law
is now in shambles after decades of narrowly focused, piecemeal legislation; the notice and
consent approach taken in various information privacy statutes has achieved only modest
success.57 Perhaps narrowly focused, piecemeal legislation to reform contract law is better than
nothing it if can help stem the rising tide of spyware being loaded on consumers, but it is no
substitute for a more general reappraisal of the current state of contract law as it applies to online
transactions.
In contrast, the EU Directive on Unfair Contract Terms was promulgated in 1993 and
provides a very successful example of a reorientation of contract law following such a general
reappraisal.58 Member States were expected to pass laws implementing its provisions by the end
of 1994. The Directive provides that contract terms not individually negotiated will be deemed
unfair if they create a significant imbalance, to the consumer’s detriment, between the rights and
obligations of the contracting parties.59 If a contract term is drafted in advance and the consumer
has no influence over the substance of the term, then it is always considered not to be
individually negotiated, and hence subject to review based on substantive fairness.60 An annex
to the directive contains an expansive list of terms that may be deemed unfair.61 The nature of

55. Spy Act section 3 provides that it is unlawful to transmit an adware program to a computer or execute adware
software on a computer unless the consumer is provided with a clear, explicit notice that personal information will
be collected and provided an opportunity to consent to that function; the end user can easily identify the adware
program and remove it, and when advertisements are displayed, the adware company is identified as the source of
the ad.
56. By contrast, distributors of nefarious or fraudulent spyware are unlikely to be any more deterred by the Spy Act
than distributors of fraudulent spam e-mails have been deterred by the CAN SPAM Act.
57. See Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 826-28 (2000) (discussing the
shortcomings of the informed consent model of information privacy protection).
58. Council Directive 93/13 EEC, supra note 8; see generally, James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in
the Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 109 (2003).
59. Council Directive 93/13 EEC, supra note 8 at art. 3.
60. Id. at art. 2.
61. The terms listed in the annex include:
(a) excluding or limiting the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the event of the death of a
consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from an act or omission of that seller or
supplier;
(b) inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis the seller or
supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or inadequate
performance by the seller or supplier of any of the contractual obligations, including the option of
offsetting a debt owed to the seller or supplier against any claim which the consumer may have
against him;
(c) making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of services by the seller or
supplier is subject to a condition whose realization depends on his own will alone;
(d) permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where the latter decides
not to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for the consumer to receive
compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller or supplier where the latter is the party
cancelling the contract;
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the goods or services covered by the contract, the circumstances surrounding the drawing up of
the contract, and the other terms in the contract or in another contract to which it relates will be
taken into account in assessing the unfairness of a term.62 Contract terms offered to consumers
in writing must always be drafted in plain language and where there is doubt as to the meaning of
a term, the interpretation most favorable to the consumer will prevail.63 In the event that terms in
a consumer contract are found to be unfair, those terms will not be binding on consumers,
although the remainder of the contract will be enforceable.64
Adware clickwrap agreements would likely be unenforceable under the law of EU
member states on the grounds that consumers are normally required to agree to the contract
terms before having any real opportunity to become acquainted with them. However, the list of
unfair terms in the Annex to the Directive are merely suggestive and not in any way limiting. As
a result, a court in an EU member state might find that contract terms are unfair and thus
(e) requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a disproportionately high sum
in compensation;
(f) authorizing the seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary basis where the
same facility is not granted to the consumer, or permitting the seller or supplier to retain the sums
paid for services not yet supplied by him where it is the seller or supplier himself who dissolves
the contract;
(g) enabling the seller or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate duration without
reasonable notice except where there are serious grounds for doing so;
(h) automatically extending a contract of fixed duration where the consumer does not indicate
otherwise, when the deadline fixed for the consumer to express this desire not to extend the
contract is unreasonably early;
(i) irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of becoming
acquainted before the conclusion of the contract;
(j) enabling the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without a valid
reason which is specified in the contract;
(k) enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid reason any characteristics of
the product or service to be provided;
(l) providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery or allowing a seller of
goods or supplier of services to increase their price without in both cases giving the consumer the
corresponding right to cancel the contract if the final price is too high in relation to the price
agreed when the contract was concluded;
(m) giving the seller or supplier the right to determine whether the goods or services supplied are
in conformity with the contract, or giving him the exclusive right to interpret any term of the
contract;
(n) limiting the seller’s or supplier’s obligation to respect commitments undertaken by his agents
or making his commitments subject to compliance with a particular formality;
(o) obliging the consumer to fulfill all his obligations where the seller or supplier does not perform
his;
(p) giving the seller or supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and obligations under the
contract, where this may serve to reduce the guarantees for the consumer, without the latter’s
agreement;
(q) excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any other legal
remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not
covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a
burden of proof which, according to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the
contract.
Unfair Contract Terms Directive Annex.
62. Council Directive 93/13 EEC, supra note 8 at art. 4.
63. Id. at art. 5.
64. Id. at art. 6.
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unenforceable if they purport to permit a software distributor to load several software programs
at once without clearly disclosing that more than one program is being loaded, or to load an
adware program on a computer without clearly explaining its functions.
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive takes the opposite approach of current U.S. contract
law: instead of a presumption of deference to whatever novel contract interface the merchant has
developed, the Directive substitutes a presumption that the merchant will be bound to a contract
based on the reasonable expectations of the consumer. Under such a standard for contract
formation, it would be easy to predict that objectionable adware products would not be protected
by click-through contract interfaces. Furthermore, even adware distributors that clearly and
explicitly disclosed their business models – which is all that proposed U.S. legislation such as the
Spy Act would require – might find that some elements of those business models would not be
permitted notwithstanding the full disclosure if the behavior that the contract purports to
authorize is not actually fair to consumers.
5. Conclusion
Adware distributors believe that consumers want the comparison advertisements they
provide. Many others believe that such programs are simply another form of spyware, and that
consumers would not accept such programs on their computers if adware distributors were
required to disclose the purpose and functions of the software clearly and explicitly. If existing
contract law doctrine regarding the formation of contracts were applied rigorously and
consistently, then contract law might provide an effective mechanism for determining which
description of reality is more accurate. However, whatever rigor and vitality applicable contract
law doctrine might have possessed has already been dissipated by courts trying to accommodate
a wide range of innovation in contracting systems. As a result, courts reviewing the contracting
interfaces used by adware distributors in light of current law are unlikely to demand that they
make clear and explicit disclosures before claiming that consumers have consented to running
their software.
Law reform efforts aimed at filling this apparent gap in contract doctrine appear narrowly
targeted at problems associated with a particular technology – spyware – and so are unlikely to
have any impact on the balance of power between merchant and consumer under contract law
doctrine generally. This piecemeal, sectoral approach to the reform of contract law is
reminiscent of the U.S. approach to information privacy law, which has proved to be a dismal
failure. One alternative to a narrowly targeted, ad hoc approach to controversies in contract law
triggered by specific technological innovations would be to address the balance of power
between merchant and consumer more generally, following the approach taken in the EU Unfair
Contract Terms Directive. However, the pronounced U.S. proclivity for market-oriented rather
than regulatory approaches to new commercial practices makes it very unlikely that such an
approach would be tried in the U.S.
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